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Abstract: This article examines the conceptual structure of the main constructions in 
which Levin’s (1993) contribute verbs appear, viz. the ditransitive and the dative con-
structions, which often alternate. The present paper questions the reliability of Levin’s 
semantic criterion for contribute verbs and shows that the integration of these verbs into 
the dative construction is licensed by several factors, such as the presence of multiple 
agents, multiple transferred entities and multiple recipients which deprofile the posses-
sive relationship between a unique recipient and an object (e.g. contribute, administer, 
distribute), and the conceptual prominence of the motion event over the possession 
relationship between the recipient and the object (e.g. refer, transfer), among others.
Keywords: ditransitive construction, dative construction, Lexical Constructional Model, 
internal/external constraints, Focal Prominence Compatibility constraint.
Resumen: Este artículo examina la estructura conceptual de las principales construc-
ciones en las que aparecen los verbos de contribución de Levin (1993), concretamente 
las construcciones ditransitiva y dativa que alternan a menudo. El presente trabajo 
cuestiona la fiabilidad del criterio semántico de Levin para los verbos de contribución y 
demuestra que la subsunción de estos verbos en la construcción dativa se rige por var-
ios factores, como la presencia de múltiples agentes, múltiples entidades transferidas y 
múltiples recipientes que desenfocan la relación de posesión entre un único recipiente 
y un objeto (ej. contribuir, administrar, distribuir), y la prominencia conceptual del 
evento de movimiento sobre la relación de posesión entre el recipiente y el objeto (ej. 
remitir, transferir), entre otros.
Palabras clave: construcción ditransitiva, construcción dativa, Modelo Léxico Con-
struccional, restricciones internas y externas, Compatibilidad de la Prominencia Focal.
1. INTRODUCTION
The main concern of this study is to explain the cognitive principles that regulate the 
constructional use of Levin’s (1993) contribute verb class. Levin (1993: 138) includes 
contribute verbs within the larger class of verbs of change of possession. According to 
77  The research on which this paper is based has been financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and 
Competitiveness, grant no. FFI2013–43593–P.
Why *John can’t contribute Mary money...140 Andreea Rosca y Francisco J. Ruiz de Mendoza
Odisea, nº 17, ISSN 1578–3820, 2016, 139–157
this author, contribute verbs differ from other sister classes (e.g. verbs of giving, future 
having, and get verbs) in that they cannot participate in the ditransitive construction (cf. 
*We contributed her our paycheck, but We gave/offered/got her a job), but they take part 
in the dative construction (e.g. We contributed our paycheck to her), which we will treat 
(see section 3 below) as a subcase of the caused–motion construction. Nevertheless, our 
corpora examples clearly demonstrate that some of these verbs do accept the ditransitive 
construction (section 4). Furthermore, there are very few linguists (e.g. Davidse 1996; Van 
der Leek 1996) that have been concerned with the analysis of this verbal class in connection 
to the dative construction. This is striking in the light of the fact that contribute verbs, as 
will be shown below, have an idiosyncratic constructional behavior which separates them 
off from other verb classes. It will also be argued that an exclusively lexicalist approach 
like the one propounded by Levin (1993) is not the key to the (in)compatibility of these 
verbs with the ditransitive and the dative constructions.
The theoretical framework of our analysis is the Lexical Constructional Model or 
LCM (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2008; Ruiz de Mendoza 2013). This model stands 
halfway between Goldberg’s (2006) top–down account and the bottom–up constructionist 
approaches propounded by authors like Boas (2003), Iwata (2008), or Nemoto (2005). The 
LCM boasts an explanatory apparatus of internal and external constraints which constitute 
useful analytical tools to account for the constructional behavior of contribute verbs. The 
internal constraints concern the internal structure of a predicate, i.e. its encyclopedic and 
event structure makeup whereas the external constraints refer to construal mechanisms such 
as high–level metaphor and metonymy.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2 we devote some space to the aspects of 
the LCM that have proved useful to endow our study with explanatory adequacy. In section 
3 we introduce the reader to the ditransitive and the dative constructions, which are our 
object of study. Section 4 critically reviews Levin’s (1993) semantic criterion for contribute 
verbs whereas sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 discuss the factors that motivate their lexical–con-
structional behavior. The final section summarizes all the findings of our investigation.
2. WHY THE LEXICAL CONSTRUCTIONAL MODEL?
We have chosen the LCM as a theoretical framework for our study since Goldberg’s 
(2006) broad generalizations, while elegant, have proved by themselves insufficient to fully 
help us to discern why some verbs combine more easily with a given construction while 
others do not. In the same vein as Langacker (1991: 331), Goldberg distinguishes between the 
participant roles of a verb and the argument roles of a construction. In her view, participant 
roles of verbs “fuse” with the argument roles of constructions, which can contribute roles 
not present in the lexical predicate characterizations. There are two principles that regulate 
this fusion process (Goldberg 2005: 8): (i) The Semantic Coherence Principle, which posits 
that that there must be semantic compatibility between the participant and argument roles, 
and (ii) The Correspondence Principle, by which the participant roles that are semantically 
salient must fuse with grammatical relations that provide them with discourse prominence.
It is true that in some cases constructions constitute better meaning predictors than verbs. 
Thus, the transfer meaning of the sentence John kicked Tom the ball is clearly supplied by 
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the ditransitive construction, which augments the quantitative valence of the predicate kick. 
However, Goldberg’s constructionist approach falls short of providing a full explanation 
of lexical–constructional integration in several respects. First, her explanatory apparatus 
places excessive emphasis on the role performed by constructions, while the rich semantic 
information supplied by verbs is neglected. For the sake of clarity, take into account the 
intransitive resultative construction […] an army mutiny rapidly ballooned into a major 
political rebellion […] (Sketch engine doc#1151065). It may be true that the result is sup-
plied by the construction itself but the choice of this result is greatly constrained by the 
information encapsulated into the metaphorical use of the verb balloon (i.e. the intensity of 
the mutiny, which may end up in a major outbreak of violence, is seen in terms of a balloon 
swelling to a point in which it may burst out) and by the changing entity. Therefore, the Z 
element (political rebellion) has greater meaning implications than the Y element (mutiny). 
In the LCM this phenomenon is explained by means of the constraint labeled Internal Vari-
able Conditioning, which regulates the way in which the conceptual structure from verbal 
predicates places constraints on the nature of constructional arguments.
Boas (2003: 113–116; 2008b: 120–123) has argued that Goldberg’s broad–scale lexical 
entries fail to predict the distributional pattern within a specific verbal class. For example 
in our case, the verbs donate and contribute share the same minimal set of participant 
roles (cf. donate <donor donation donee>, contribute <contributor contribution goal/
contributee>), but only the former is allowed to fuse with the ditransitive construction 
(e.g. She donated him her kidney; *She contributed the collection 1000$). From this we 
can infer that lexical entries are not sufficient to explain the difference between these two 
verbs at the syntactic level. Therefore, the best solution to this problem is to find a model 
that gives more prominence to lower–level configurations and the lexical information 
associated with them. A coherent lexical–constructional model is the one propounded by 
Boas (2003). Nevertheless, Boas’s focus on mini–constructions is excessive, to the detri-
ment of high–level constructions, their argument structure contribution and the possible 
principles that regulate the interaction between verbs and constructions. Mini–construc-
tions are form–meaning pairings differing in complexity from more abstract constructions. 
Consider the AHTY mini–construction or ‘a hole through the Y’. There are two main verb 
classes that combine with this construction: Class I, which comprises verbs such as push, 
knock, burn, and blow (e.g. He suggests we knock a hole through the wall), and Class II, 
which contains verbs like drill, create, make, and dig (e.g. Using a hammer drill and car-
bide bit, drill a hole through the sill plate). The AHTY construction describes an activity 
carried out by an agent applying energy, where the activity causes the creation of a hole 
in a surface. Obviously the definition of this mini–construction rules out figurative uses of 
AHTY (e.g. Claire glared/stared a hole through Natasha). We wonder if we must posit a 
new mini–construction for this additional meaning. Boas (2008a: 25 ft 10) admits that his 
analysis ignores metaphorical uses of this mini–construction simply because they display 
low productivity. However, we contend that such statement should at least be endorsed by 
a frequency based search of these verbs. Luzondo (2011: 84) points out that the LCM ex-
plains these figurative usages by means of the high–level metaphor AN ACTIVITY IS AN 
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EFFECTUAL ACTION,78 which enables us to conceive the staring look of a person as if 
it were able to physically affect a patient. A similar explanation holds true for the sentence 
[…] emails blew a hole through Mr. McNulty’s testimony (Sketch engine doc#201938), 
in which a testimony that is dismantled by further evidence is understood in terms of an 
object whose physical integrity has been altered.
The LCM only postulates constructions (at whatever level of granularity, including 
mini–constructions) when no other higher–level explanatory mechanism is capable of 
dealing with a specific form–meaning association. Among its analytical tools we find the 
following (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 2013; Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera 2014 for more detailed 
accounts):
1. Vertical constraints: these include across–level conceptual compatibility constraints 
at whatever degree of abstraction. The Internal Variable Compatibility constraint 
deals with the encyclopedic–knowledge structure of lexical items. This is low–level 
conceptual structure. For example, we know that horses bray and cats purr. The 
sentence When will your cat stop braying?, while not impossible, is odd on account 
of our world knowledge. The solution to this conceptual compatibility problem lies 
in finding contextual reasons where the sentence is possible with special meaning 
effects (for example, the cat makes a strange noise that sounds like a horse’s bray 
and bothers the speaker). On a higher level, the different event structure of the 
otherwise related verbs demolish and break endows them with likewise different 
constructional realization possibilities. Thus, the verb break can occur in the tran-
sitive, resultative, and inchoative constructions: The child broke the vase (into a 
thousand little fragments); The vase broke. By contrast, the verb demolish can only 
be integrated into the first two constructions: They demolished the building (into 
rubble); but it cannot have an inchoative use: *The building demolished. The rea-
son for the different constructional behavior between break and demolish, despite 
lower–level semantic similarities, is to be found in corresponding differences in 
their event–structure (or high–level) characterization: break involves a change of 
state, while demolish is a cessation–of–existence verb, i.e. they belong to different 
lexical classes at their highest level of meaning–structure characterization. This is 
just one among other possible Lexical Class constraints identified in the LCM (cf. 
Galera and Ruiz de Mendoza 2012; Rosca 2012).
 Another vertical constraint is the Event Identification Condition. According to 
it, for a verb to be subsumed into a construction, both must have the same event 
structure. This means, for example, that only caused motion verbs can take part in 
the caused–motion construction, as is the case of kick, push, and hit: They kicked/
pushed/hit the ball into the hole. This constraint can be overridden in several 
ways. An interesting possibility is provided by metaphorical re–construal, as in 
My boss stared me out of her office. In this example, the verb stare, which is only 
a target–oriented activity verb, is re–construed as if it were an effectual action 
predicate (like caused–motion predicates). In this way, psychological impact giving 
78  The term activity makes reference to a goal–oriented activity, i.e. one where there is a target.
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rise to self–instigated motion is seen as if it were physical impact causing external 
motion. This re–construal has syntactic consequences: the (conative) preposition 
at, which is used to introduce the target of the staring activity, is dropped and the 
object is syntactically treated as a common object in a transitive configuration; the 
construction adds an extra argument (realized as a motion prepositional phrase) to 
the original configuration for stare.
 The last constraint that we will treat in this subsection is the Focal Compatibility 
Constraint, which places limitations on the constructional behavior of verbal 
predicates on the basis of conceptual prominence factors. For example, whereas 
the verb send can be used, in the context of information transmission, both with the 
dative and the ditransitive constructions (He sent the message to me and He sent 
me the message), the verb fax is better used in the dative construction (i.e. He faxed 
the message to the company is preferred to He faxed the company the message). 
This is due to the fact that the verb fax means ‘to send a fax to communicate a 
message’, thus giving prominence to the communicative activity (and the role of 
the fax machine in it) but not to the transfer of information, which means that the 
message is not profiled as a possession. Since the ditransitive, but not the dative 
construction focuses on the possession of the transferred element, it follows that 
the ditransitive use of fax creates a focal prominence clash.
2. Horizontal constraints. There are two related horizontal constraints: Predicate–
Argument Conditioning and Internal Variable Conditioning. The former requires 
co–instantiation consistency both between a predicate and its arguments and among 
all the arguments. For example, She drove me into despair is licensed by this con-
straint, but not *She drove her car into despair. The co–instantiation of the predicate 
‘drive’ and the prepositional phrase in the figurative–motion construction call for 
a human object. This is not the case if we have a different prepositional phrase 
calling for a non–figurative use of the caused–motion construction (She drove the 
car into the pond). The latter constraint is based on the encyclopedic knowledge 
requirements of a verbal predicate when used in a given construction. For example, 
think of the use of the verb shrink in the figurative motion construction: The number 
of scientologists has shrunk into half in recent years. Since ‘shrinking’ involves a 
decrease in size, which carries over metaphorically to amount, it would be impos-
sible to use the same configuration as follows: *The number of scientologists has 
shrunk into twice as many in recent years.
3. External constraints, especially (high–level) metaphor and metonymy. These 
involve re–construing the event–structure of a predicate in such a way that it can 
be made to fit into a constructional configuration with different event–structure 
requirements. The metaphorical re–construal of stare discussed above provides a 
clear example. Another example is supplied by inchoative constructions. These 
are possible when an action predicate can be seen as if it were a process that is 
then made to stand for the underlying action. In The door opened we know that 
there is an animate entity or a force that has performed the action of opening the 
Why *John can’t contribute Mary money...144 Andreea Rosca y Francisco J. Ruiz de Mendoza
Odisea, nº 17, ISSN 1578–3820, 2016, 139–157
door. However, the speaker has chosen to re–construe the action as if it were not 
such but a process where the true agent can be seen as instrumental. The resulting 
expression stands for the underlying action: The door opened with/*by the wind, 
i.e. the wind opened the door.
3. THE DITRANSITIVE AND THE DATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
Before focusing on the principles that license or block out the participation of contrib-
ute verbs in the dative alternation, we would like to provide readers with a brief overview 
of this constructional phenomenon. The dative alternation (also termed ‘dative shift’) is 
made up of ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ dative (Wierzbicka 1988) or a dative realized by 
double objects [NP/SUBJ [VP/PRED NP/OBJ1 NP/OBJ2]] (e.g. John gave Susan a book) 
versus a dative realized by a prepositional phrase, either to or for [NP/SUBJ [VP/PRED 
NP/OBJ PP/OBL]] (e.g. John gave a book to Susan). The former receives the name of 
ditransitive construction whereas the latter is called dative construction. From now on, the 
term construction will replace the notion of syntactic alternation, which is reminiscent of 
Chomskyan derivations. The LCM treats this notion as epiphenomenal, viz. the side effect 
of variation in lexical–constructional subsumption (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2011). 
In the transformational tradition, the ditransitive construction was understood as a derivation 
from the dative or prepositional construction, while in the LCM, like in cognitively–oriented 
constructionist accounts of language, the two constructions arise independently of each 
other, but can be used as alternate ways of construing the same state of affairs. For example, 
I gave the book to John (dative) looks at the giving action in terms of the spatial transfer 
of an object from the giver to the receiver (i.e. the gift moves), while I gave John the book 
(ditransitive) focuses on the end–result of the action (the book is in John’s possession).
Furthermore, the dative and ditransitive constructions do not always alternate. Goldberg 
(1995) has accounted for the conditions that may block the use of the ditransitive. Goldberg 
(1995) states that the ditransitive construction can be skeletally represented as X CAUSES 
Y TO RECEIVE Z. This construction is regulated by the following semantic constraints:
(i) It supplies transfer semantics that cannot be ascribed to the lexical verb.
(ii) The goal argument must be animate (recipient rather than patient).
(iii) Two non–predicative NPs are licensed in post–verbal position.
(iv) The recipient role is correlated with an object function.
(v) The subject position must be occupied by a volitional agent who intends transfer.
Thus, in the sentence Sue knitted Mary a sweater, the transfer meaning is contributed 
by the ditransitive construction and not by the lexical verb knit, which solely describes the 
creation of a fabric or garment by joining thread in a series of connected loops, either by 
hand, using knitting needles or on a machine. The semantic constraint in (ii) was postulated 
to account for the ungrammaticality of utterances like *John sent Madrid the book, where 
Madrid, which is not a prototypical recipient but an inanimate location, cannot be said to 
actively participate in the reception event. Goldberg herself (1992: 61) remarks that the 
recipient animacy constraint is obscured by an example like The music lent the party a 
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festive air, where neither the subject nor the receiver are animate. She solves this problem 
by postulating the CAUSAL EVENTS ARE TRANSFERS metaphor which allows the 
animacy of the recipient to be satisfied in the source domain, but not the target domain of 
the metaphor.
Furthermore, the semantic constraint in (v) blocks out the subsumption of verbs like pony 
up, cough up, shell out, or fork out into the ditransitive construction (cf. George ponied up/
coughed up/shelled out/forked out $ 3000 to Bob vs. *George ponied up/coughed up/shelled 
out/forked out Bob $ 3000). The LCM accounts for these cases by means of the Lexical 
Class constraint whereby membership to a certain verbal class determines the syntactic 
behavior of that verb. Thus, the verbs mentioned above belong to a class that gathers all the 
verbs encoding unwillingness of transfer on the part of the agent. The agent’s unwillingness 
to transfer an entity to the recipient makes these verbs incompatible with the ditransitive 
construction, which requires the agent’s intention to cause the recipient to have an entity.
At this point, it is worth noting that the semantic constraint in (v) does not seem to 
hold for the following: […] if he sometimes almost won, that lent him hope and kept him 
playing on (BNC 898)79. Nevertheless, Goldberg (1992) accounts for examples like this by 
postulating the low–level metaphor CAUSAL EVENTS ARE TRANSFERS. In our sen-
tence the giver is mapped onto the causing entity, which is an event, whereas the receiver 
is projected onto the developer of hope. The effect of the event (i.e. producing hope) is 
viewed as the transfer of an object from a lender to a receiver. Holding possession of an 
object correlates in the target domain with the effects of the action of causing someone 
to be hopeful. Goldberg (1992: 61) also argues that volitionality is not mapped onto the 
target domain simply because the target domain refers to abstract causes and volition is a 
human trait. No explanation is given for the ungrammaticality of the dative counterparts 
(e.g. *that lent hope to him). Panther (1997) takes up this issue and claims that the concept 
of causation in these cases is too abstract to be conceptualized in terms of a moving object 
sent by an agent along a path to a receiver. However, this argument is less than convincing 
given that it is possible to treat as objects very abstract concepts such as love (He has a 
lot of love for mankind), hate (We could see hate in his eyes), ideas (The idea came across 
fine), beliefs (The beliefs she has are to be respected), and so on. Besides, Panther does 
not give any criteria to determine whether a concept is more abstract than others. Thus, a 
better solution to the problem comes from the field of conceptual prominence. The verb 
lend in this expression is used in the sense of ‘provide support which is not to be returned.’ 
As mentioned above, the ditransitive construction gives prominence to the possession rela-
tionship between the receiver and the object, in contrast to the dative construction, whose 
focus of attention is on the transfer process. It follows that the ditransitive construction is 
a better choice to capture the ‘provide support’ meaning of this use of lend.
One last note should be made here about the ditransitive construction. According to 
Panther (1997), the syntactic position of the indirect object in the ditransitive construction 
iconically reflects the strong impact of the verb onto the recipient and it strengthens the 
79  Our examples have been extracted from the British National Corpus (BNC), The Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA), and The Sketch Engine. Unlike the BNC and the COCA, which are instances of 
monolingual corpora, the Sketch engine provides access to large corpora (ranging from 30 million to 10 billion 
words) for 42 languages.
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implicature of possession, which is cancellable in the case of the prepositional construc-
tion (cf. I handed my book to him, but he didn’t take it vs. ?I handed him my book, but he 
didn’t take it).
As far as the dative construction is concerned, the LCM treats it, like Goldberg (1995, 
2002), as a subcase of the caused–motion construction (X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z, 
where the Z element denotes the path of motion expressed by the oblique or directional 
prepositional phrase). The dative construction can be explained in terms of give verbs being 
licensed into the caused–motion construction by the high–level metaphor TRANSFER IS 
MOTION. Take for example the sentences in (1):
(1) a. John gave a book to Mary.
 b. John sent a book to Mary.
 c. John sent a book to Madrid.
Sentence (1a) illustrates a prototypical dative construction since the transfer–of–pos-
session meaning conveyed by the verb give, although construed in terms of motion of the 
gift to its destination, still prevails over the motion element and the destination of motion 
is primarily construed as a human recipient. Example (1b) is a less prototypical case of the 
dative construction since it explicitly incorporates the motion element through the verb 
send; the human recipient is thus primarily construed as the destination of motion. Finally, 
(1c) is a canonical case of the caused–motion construction since it combines a motion verb 
with an inanimate location as the destination of motion; the existence of a potential human 
recipient is to be inferred. The examples reproduced in (1)(a)-(c) reveal that there is a con-
tinuum from a pure transfer meaning (1a) to a purely motional meaning (1c). The dative 
construction (1a) is only a subcase of the caused–motion construction where the dative 
element does not arise from the construction itself but from the combination of a transfer 
verb and a human recipient. When dealing with the ditransitive and the dative constructions, 
Pinker (1989) posits that the ditransitive has the form [X acts–on Z] to the effect that [Z 
has Y] whereas the prepositional variant [i.e. the dative] has the semantics [X acts–on Y] 
to the effect that [Y goes to Z]. As mentioned above, Goldberg (1995, 2002) considers the 
dative construction to be a daughter construction of the caused–motion construction (cf. 
Colleman and De Clerck 2009). Other scholars that have understood the dative construc-
tion as a case of caused motion are Pesetsky (1995), Panther (1997), Harley (2002) and 
Krifka (2004). Additionally, Pinker (1989) and Langacker (1991) understand the difference 
between the ditransitive and the dative in terms of focal prominence. In their view, the 
ditransitive construction focalizes the possessive relationship between a recipient and an 
entity whereas the dative construction stresses a path scenario, i.e. the trajectory followed 
by the transferred object. Similarly, Panther (1997) claims that the dative construction has 
a spatial (metaphorical) basis, that is to say, a spatial scenario involving motion is mapped 
onto a more abstract transfer–of–possession scenario.
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4. LEVIN’S SEMANTIC CRITERION FOR CONTRIBUTE VERBS
Levin (1993) lists eighteen verbs which share the conceptual structure and the syntactic 
configuration of the verb contribute, i.e. administer, disburse, distribute, donate, extend, 
forfeit, proffer, refer, reimburse, relinquish, remit, restore, return, sacrifice, submit, surren-
der, transfer. Levin (1993) claims that the internal semantic parameters of a verb function 
as important predictors of its range of syntactic representations. Thus, Levin’s (1993: 138) 
contribute verbs must have in common a contribution sense which motivates their compat-
ibility with the dative but not with the ditransitive (nor with the with–construction attested 
with entrust). Nevertheless, verbs like remit, return, reimburse, proffer, and even donate 
were found to participate in the ditransitive construction:80
(2) a. She was deprived of all means of remitting him money (Sketch engine 
doc#1223079)
 b. I returned him the keys […] (Sketch engine doc#220759)
 c. The landowner reimbursed him $500 of the cost of the fertilizer in February 
2007 (Sketch engine doc#1118556)
 d. He smilingly proffered me a cup of watered wine […] (COCA 1992)
 e. Luckily for him his cousin donated him a kidney (Sketch engine doc#299426)
These counterexamples cast doubt on the validity of Levin’s (1993) semantic criteri-
on for verbs of contribution. Can we really say that a verb inherits its syntactic behavior 
exclusively from one semantic class? And what is more, what should we understand by a 
contribution sense? The presence of several donors with their several donations, the bene-
factive meaning supplied by the action performed by the agent/agents or both? What most 
of these verbs have in common is the fact that the action denoted by the verb is somewhat 
beneficial for the recipient. Thus, in the sentence He had previously relinquished his post 
to his brother […] (BNC GSX 534) there is only one giver who renounces his position in 
favor of a recipient. In some cases it may happen that the transferred entity is not benefit-
ing the receiver in any way. This can be observed in the sentence You mean, could I have 
administered poison to Sir Thomas? (COCA 1992), which lends itself to a malefactive 
reading, i.e. the recipient’s life is threatened by an ingested entity. From this discussion still 
arises another question. Can we really assume that the use of the to–dative in this sentence 
is licensed by a contribution meaning? There is no collaboration of multiple agents nor 
does the sentential meaning involve a beneficial transfer for the recipient. Last, how would 
Levin account for a sentence like […] he transferred it [the envelope] to the inside pocket 
of his jacket […] (COCA 1979)81, in which there is only one agent, there is no animate 
recipient and the connotations of the transfer are neutral? If Levin grouped these verbs under 
80  It should be mentioned that Levin (1993) classifies these five verbs as contribute verbs but she provides no 
examples to support their similarity in constructional behavior, i.e. participation in the dative construction and 
rejection of the ditransitive construction.
81  This sentence is similar to He restored the handkerchief to his pocket (BNC FS8 3840), in which another 
supposedly contribute verb is used in the dative construction. In this utterance a volitional agent moves a con-
crete entity to a location with the implication that that was the former location of the entity.
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the contribute class label because of the activation of a benefiter model, then what would 
differentiate this class from give–type verbs which can also involve a beneficial transfer 
for the recipient? So, how valid is this semantic criterion for the motivation of the dative 
construction? Obviously, in view of these problems, it is not a fully reliable one.
In the next sections the aim is to show that the subsumption of these verbs into the 
dative construction is licensed by several factors, such as (i) the presence of multiple agents, 
multiple transferred entities and multiple recipients that deprofile the possessive relationship 
between a unique recipient and an object; (ii) the lack of an animate recipient that can coop-
erate in the transferring event; (iii) the CONTAINER image–schema evoked by some verbs, 
and (iv) the motion to a different location that gains more prominence than the possession 
relationship between a recipient and an object. Hence, we cannot place the whole burden 
of subsumption uniquely on the conceptual make–up of verbs since lexical–constructional 
integration can also be governed by the focal requirements of a construction, by the semantics 
of the subject and objects, and by contextual factors, as generally postulated by the LCM.
4.1. Multiple giving events
After the above preamble on the principles that regulate the subsumption of Levin’s 
(1993) contribute verbs into the dative construction, we move on to discuss them in greater 
detail.
We will first examine the case of the verb contribute. Consider the sentence We con-
tributed our paycheck to her, which was extracted from Levin (1993: 139). This sentence 
is an example of the dative construction, which we treat as a subcase of the caused–motion 
construction, as already mentioned in section 3. The reason for this treatment lies in the 
experiential grounding of the meaning of the dative construction, which basically conveys a 
transfer of possession. However, the dative highlights the importance of the object transferred 
over the transfer itself (which in some cases may not even take place physically). As noted 
in Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2011), a prototypical transfer of possession involves the 
giver handing the object over to the recipient. In this process, the giver loses possession of 
the object, which after the transfer has been completed, falls within the recipient’s sphere 
of control. In this prototypical scenario, the giver is a causer of motion, the gift is a moving 
object and the recipient is the destination of motion. Non–prototypical uses of the dative 
construction substitute ‘affording access to the object’ for ‘causing the object to move from 
the giver to the recipient’ and ‘gaining control’ for ‘gaining possession’ of the object given. 
In We contributed our paycheck to her, which is an example of non–prototypical use, the 
paycheck is thus seen as coming under the control of the recipient, whether the paycheck 
has been physically and personally handed over to the recipient by the contributors or not. 
The dative construction is thus a special case of the caused–motion construction where 
there is a conflation between the roles of destination and recipient of an object, with greater 
degree of prominence on the recipient role.
As noted above, the dative construction can alternate with the ditransitive construction 
(cf. John gave a book to Peter/John gave Peter a book), each alternate involving a different 
case of construal. But the exceptions to this kind of alternation are notable. A case in point 
is the verb contribute, which cannot take part in the ditransitive construction (cf. *We con-
149
Odisea, nº 17, ISSN 1578–3820, 2016, 139–157
Why *John can’t contribute Mary money...Andreea Rosca y Francisco J. Ruiz de Mendoza
tributed her our paycheck). The reason for this puzzling property of this verb, however, is 
not captured by the set of internal and external constraints postulated thus far in the LCM. 
Let us first consider internal constraints, which relate to the event structure of lexical items 
and their associated encyclopedic knowledge components. Contribute inherits much of its 
internal structure from give: there is a transfer of possession (any object for give and usu-
ally money for contribute) from a donor to a recipient. If the transfer involves a material 
object, there is also motion of the transferred object across space. Since we have both the 
possession and the transfer elements, it is only natural to find a transfer verb like give both 
in the ditransitive and the dative constructions. However, contribute, which contains the 
same transfer and possession elements as give, only takes part in the dative construction. 
If internal constraints based on the conceptual structure of the lexical and constructional 
configurations cannot account for this behavior, we may wonder whether this may be a 
matter of external constraints or not. However, upon closer scrutiny, this does not seem to 
be the case, since this verb is allowed in the dative construction on the same grounds as 
other give verbs and it is disallowed where no conversion process is required. Therefore, 
the solution to this problem needs to be found elsewhere. We would like to argue that the 
explanation is to be found in the area of focal prominence phenomena, as discussed in the 
context of Cognitive Grammar (cf. Langacker 1987, 1999). By way of illustration, consider 
Langacker’s (1991: 13–14) explanation of the contrast between the dative and ditransitive 
in terms of the prominence given to certain facets of a ‘sending’ scenario. This explanation 
is consistent with the position taken by Goldberg (1995) but places more emphasis on focal 
prominence:
(3) a. Bill sent a walrus to Joyce.
 b. Bill sent Joyce a walrus.
The dative construction in (3a) lends more conceptual prominence to the trajectory 
followed by the transferred entity whereas (3b) focuses more on the possessive relationship 
between the walrus and Joyce which “results when the walrus completes its trajectory” 
(Langacker, 1991: 13–14). The difference between these two ways of construing the same 
event is supported by the acceptability of I sent a walrus to Antarctica and the ungram-
maticality of ?I sent Antarctica a walrus. The first sentence is “fully acceptable because to 
emphasizes the path traversed by the walrus, and a continent can perfectly well be construed 
as the endpoint of a path” (1991: 14). The second sentence is incorrect because “it is harder 
to construe a continent as a possessor exercising control over other entities” (1991: 14).
However, the subsumption of the verb contribute into the dative construction cannot 
be explained only in terms of the destination–beneficiary perspective. This situation calls 
for the addition of another internal constraint to the list provided by the LCM. We shall 
call this constraint Focal Prominence Compatibility. According to this constraint, which 
is not based on structural compatibility between concepts, a verb cannot be fused with a 
construction if the inherent focal prominence requirements of the verb and the construction 
are different. Thus, the verb contribute means to “give something [money/goods/effort/
time/ideas/help] along with others to a common fund or for a common purpose”. The basic 
schema of contribute is represented below:
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Figure 1. Basic schema of the verb contribute
X is the agent who causes Y (the amount of money) to go to Z (a common fund). The 
subscripted numbers (from 1 to n) refer to multiple subjects who give different amounts 
of money. 
As can be observed, this verb presupposes the existence of multiple giving events, 
which makes it clash with the focal requirements of the ditransitive construction (i.e. a 
unique/single possessive relationship between a recipient and an object).82
Now, both contribute and donate exploit the motion construal in which entity Y moves 
from X to Z. Van der Leek (1996: 331) assumes that donate cannot appear in the ditransitive 
construction because the goal of this verb is typically an (inanimate) institution that cannot 
cooperate and the ditransitive construction requires cooperation on the part of the recipient 
(cf. *He threw the tree the ball). However, there are two problems with this assumption. 
First, an institution can in fact cooperate; it does so through the people who are responsible 
for it. Second, we find both ditransitive and dative uses of donate, as in Luckily for him 
his cousin donated him a kidney (Sketch engine doc#299426) and […] his cousin donated 
a kidney to him, where the recipient is animate and in fact does cooperate. What actually 
differentiates donate from other contribute–type verbs is that the object given (usually 
money) is intended for a good cause, i.e. there is an initial recipient, which may or may 
not be an institution, and a final beneficiary –which may or may not coincide with the 
recipient– which is generally recognized to be the best possible destination of the money. 
The difference between contribute and donate is that donations are not joint ventures, i.e. 
they are not made in common with others. That is why one “donates” (not contributes) 
blood or an organ. But donations, like contributions, involve the existence of a fund or an 
(expectedly beneficial) cause.
We now turn to another verb, distribute, which is defined as sharing things among the 
members of a particular group. Van der Leek (1996: 331) suggests that the reason why 
contribute and distribute only select the dative construction is that contribute presupposes 
82  The verb contribute favors not only the dative construction but also other syntactic configurations which en-
code directionality and highlight the trajectory followed by a transferred entity (e.g. It is a tremendous achieve-
ment for the twenty–nine people of the department who all contributed towards the donation; BNC HRY 256; 
Kids contributed towards cleaning the house). These constructions are licensed by the metaphor GOALS ARE 
DESTINATIONS, whereby life purposes are conceptualized as destinations (cf. Tom and Mary are heading 
towards divorce).
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the existence of multiple givers and distribute implies the existence of multiple recipients. 
Thus, when someone contributes to a cause, it is taken for granted that there are other 
potential contributors. When distributing, there are many different receivers. The criterion 
required by the ditransitive construction, i.e. the complementariness between the roles 
of subject and first object (a.k.a. the indirect object), is not met since there is a multiple 
aspect linked to the subject role (contribute) and to the first object role (distribute). The 
latter verb can be envisaged as a reiterative giving event in which the same acting entity 
performs multiple movements to different locations in order to give an item of equal value 
to a number of people individually. Thus, in The cughtagh […] distributed gifts to the needy 
folk in hill villages (COCA 1990), the individuality of the recipients is not important and 
their identity can be unknown, except for the sole information we have about them, viz. 
they are poor people living in hill villages. Therefore, the verb focalizes the action that 
enables the multiple recipients to come into the possession of the transferred entity. The 
Focal Prominence Compatibility constraint disallows the verb distribute from combining 
with a ditransitive construction since there are multiple recipients and it is difficult to focus 
on the possession relationship, which becomes secondary. Thus, the verb distribute displays 
the following basic schema:
Figure 2. Basic schema of the verb distribute
Contribute is characterized by an expansion of the left wing of the basic schema whereas 
distribute, which is the mirror image of contribute, expands its right part (i.e. one distributer 
X gives multiple entities (Y1-n) to multiple recipients (Z1-n)).
The verb administer can take a prepositional phrase headed by the preposition to (cf. 
One–third also administered medicines to clients […]; COCA 1993) and it typically has 
the meaning of giving someone a measured amount of medication, often by physically 
introducing the medicine into that person’s body, which evokes the image–schema of a 
transferred entity (medicine) moving from a container (hypodermic needle or syringe) into 
another container (a person’s body). The verb administer favors the transfer perspective 
over the possession one as can be seen in the examples The tall woman struggled and 
continued to call out, until Britta stood back and administered a stinging slap to her face 
(COCA 1993), The lifeboat crew administered first–aid to the fisherman […] (COCA 1993). 
We also contend that the specificity of the transferred entity (usually medicine) can be held 
responsible for the rejection of the ditransitive construction (cf. *The nurse administered 
the boy tranquillizers vs. *The nurse force–fed the patient the medicine). The ditransitive 
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construction would imply that the patient behaves like a willing recipient, which is not 
the case here. The verb administer, which means “to give [a drug/medicine/treatment] to 
someone in small portions/doses”, complies with the following basic schema:
Figure 3. Basic schema of the verb administer
This development of the Y element incorporates an iterative component (i.e. portions 
of medicine are given at certain time intervals). This makes this verb incompatible with 
the ditransitive construction, which is focused on the receiver’s possession of whatever is 
transferred rather than on the specificities of the process.
4.2. Prominence of the motion construal
A second major factor that explains the integration of some contribute verbs into 
the dative rather than the ditransitive construction relates to the fact that the motion to a 
different location is more conspicuous than the possession relationship between a recip-
ient and an object (e.g. refer, reimburse, remit, restore, return, submit, extend, transfer). 
Consider the case of the verb refer which can only appear with a prepositional phrase 
headed by the preposition to, e.g. […] my doctor referred me to a psychiatrist (BNC K53 
40). The verb refer cannot possibly accept a ditransitive construction, as evidenced by the 
ungrammaticality of *My doctor referred a psychiatrist me, since no actual possession is 
entailed between the speaker and the specialist; the only thing that is implied by this verb 
is that someone is made to move to a different location or is transferred by his/her doctor 
to another doctor’s office and this can only be conveyed by means of a dative as a subcase 
of the caused–motion construction.
Furthermore, we do not understand why Levin (1993) lists the verb transfer under the 
contribute class label given the fact that a transfer is not necessarily beneficial. In a sentence 
like […] officers were transferring him to the county jail (Sketch engine doc#24517) it is 
obvious that the location to which the direct object is moved has no positive connotations. 
Also, as has been discussed in section 4, the verb transfer can indicate a simple change of 
position of an entity from one location to another with no connotations attached to it as in 
[…] he transferred it [the envelope] to the inside pocket of his jacket […](COCA 1979). So, 
can we really motivate the dative use of transfer by postulating a unique contribution sense 
(cf. In this case, we will transfer the money to you […]; Sketch engine doc#823584)? We 
consider that in the case of the verb transfer the motional meaning becomes conceptually 
more prominent than the possession relationship which sometimes is inexistent, i.e. there 
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is no possessive relationship between a jail and its prisoners or between a pocket and its 
content. It is this shift in conceptual focalization that licenses the dative use of transfer and 
not its contributive sense.
4.3. Miscellanea
The presence of contribute verbs, such as disburse, forfeit, relinquish, sacrifice, and 
surrender, in the dative rather than the ditransitive construction, can be licensed by a number 
of factors that will be briefly discussed in what follows.
The image–schemas that certain verbs evoke (e.g. motion out of a container) make 
them suitable for the dative construction as in The government has already disbursed a 
large amount of money to the private sector. The verb disburse, which comes from the old 
French word desbourser “remove from the purse” (<bourse “purse”), suggests motion from 
a source to a destination, which explains the choice of the dative construction (cf. *The 
government has already disbursed the private sector a large amount of money).
The verbs forfeit, relinquish, sacrifice and surrender will be dealt with together since 
they are conceptually similar and can be grouped under the give up verbal class. The 
difference between the ‘giving’ act and the ‘giving up’ act lies in the fact that the former 
is understood as a voluntary transfer of information or property to another entity without 
receiving anything in return, whereas the latter is typically conceived either as a volun-
tary or involuntary act whereby a person leaves behind or stops doing a regular activity 
or abandons a habit without any transfer being involved. A sentence like A good health 
scare helps people to give up smoking (Sketch engine doc#748220) stresses the fact that 
the giving up event is caused by an external force (poor health) other than people’s will. A 
dative construction construing a situation in which an agent renounces a habit in favor of 
another person would be impossible (cf. *He gave up smoking to her). It is quite difficult 
to imagine a context in which someone gives somebody else a habit since the giving act 
is a telic event (cf. ?John gave Mary the book for three hours) and starting a habit takes 
more time (cf. Years of working late at night gave me the habit of sleeping at the computer). 
However, the giving up event can also refer to cases in which somebody stops having or 
owning something in favor of someone else (e.g. […] the seller will not be obligated to 
give up the item to the winner bidder […]; Sketch engine doc#55556).
The participation of forfeit, relinquish, sacrifice, and surrender in the dative construc-
tion83 can be explained by means of the Internal Variable Conditioning constraint: world 
knowledge information encapsulated by the internal variables of these predicates requires 
the realization of what is given up as their immediate direct object (cf. *He sacrificed Juno 
the animal, where Juno would automatically be interpreted as the direct object and not the 
indirect object).
In addition, the sentence He sacrificed the animal to Juno is based on a high–level 
metaphor whereby communication is expressed in terms of motion. The act of killing an 
83  Some corpus examples are provided here: […] the Sandinistas forfeited power to Violeta Chamorro […] 
(COCA 1992); He had previously relinquished his post to his brother […] (BNC GSX 534); He sacrificed the 
animal to Juno (Sketch engine doc#1136328); […] Mithridates’ generals in the city gave up all hope and sur-
rendered the city to him […] (Sketch engine doc#174196).
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animal metonymically stands for the plea that the killer sends to the goddess in an attempt 
to appease her. This combination of metaphor and metonymy is schematically represented 
in Table I below:
SOURCE TARGET
Causer of motion Speaker/sender
Object of caused–motion (moving object) Message of submission/obedience
Causing motion Communicating
Destination of motion (receiver of the 
moving object) Addressee
Table I. He sacrificed the animal to Juno
This sentence does not encode a spatial transfer of possession since the animal does not 
literally move from the killer to the goddess. It is rather a figurative type of transfer whereby 
a message of submission is conveyed to the goddess. The transmission of the message is 
understood as motion of a concrete object through space from the killer to the goddess.
5. CONCLUSIONS
According to Levin (1993), the internal semantic parameters of a verb can serve as 
predictors of its distributional patterns. However, we have demonstrated that Levin’s 
semantic criterion for contribute verbs may not be entirely reliable and the integration of 
these verbs into the dative construction can be motivated by several factors, among which 
we will highlight the following:
(i) The Focal Prominence Compatibility constraint explains why the verb contribute 
cannot appear in the ditransitive construction. The inherent focal prominence re-
quirements of this verb (i.e. the existence of multiple contributors with multiple 
contributions) clash with those of the ditransitive constructions (i.e. a single giving 
act).
(ii) The lack of complementariness between the roles of subject (agent) and first ob-
ject (recipient) or, in Langacker’s (1991) terms, the deprofiling of the possession 
relationship (e.g. The young woman distributed candies to all the children in her 
yard). The constructional choice for contribute verbs may also be due to the fact 
that with some of these verbs the individuality of the recipients may be irrelevant. 
Note that the recipient can be left out in distribute verbs but this is not a clear 
Animal sacrifice
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possibility in the case of give predicates: The girl distributed the leaflets [to the 
spectators] (cf. #The girl gave the leaflets).
(iii) The motion construal can sometimes become more conspicuous than the posses-
sion relationship between a recipient and an object (e.g. My GP referred me to a 
specialist).
(iv) In some cases what is given up or back by the agent must be obligatorily lexicalized 
as an immediate direct object (e.g. He relinquished his post to his brother).
Our study has additionally provided evidence in favor of an account of verbal–con-
structional integration regulated by principles like those postulated within the LCM. 
Constructional features by themselves are not enough to explain how lexical structure 
can be fruitfully projected through them into actual linguistic realization; nor can lexical 
structure be conceded a purely subsidiary role. A balanced account needs to make explicit 
the cognitive mechanisms that either license or block the use of lexical predicates with a 
given construction. Such mechanisms, which act as constraints on lexical–constructional 
integration (called subsumption in the LCM), are based on conceptual compatibility at 
different levels of abstraction, on the possibility to re–construe event structure and on 
conceptual prominence phenomena.
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